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SMITH IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Nelson Tebbe*
ABSTRACT

Employment Division v. Smith controversially held that general
laws that were neutral toward religion would no longer be
presumptively invalid, regardless of how much they incidentally
burdened religious practices. That decision sparked a debate that
continues today, twenty years later. This symposium Essay explores the
argument that subsequent courts have in fact been less constrained by
the principal rule of Smith than advocates on both sides of the
controversy usually assume. Lower courts administering real world
disputes often find they have all the room they need to grant relieffrom
general laws, given exceptions written into the decision itself and other
mechanismsfor circumventing its main rule. While this briefpiece does
not attempt to prove the empirical claim that Smith has had a limited
real-world impact, it gives reasons to think that it might be accurate.
Moreover, it tests a similar argument with respect to scholarship,
suggesting that even theorists who are sympathetic to Smith
nevertheless are more willing to agree to exemptions in particular
scenarios than is commonly realized, although importantdifferences of
degree and kind still separate them from opponents of the decision and
from each other. The Conclusion offers one reason to celebrate this
Essay's depiction of how Smith actually operates, assuming it is
correct: Raising awareness of its flexibility in the real world could
lower the stakes of the ongoing national conflict over the properplace
of religion in Americanpublic life.

* Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. This Essay elaborates on oral
comments delivered at a Symposium at Cardozo Law School marking the twentieth anniversary
of Employment Division v. Smith. I thank Marci Hamilton for organizing a terrific conversation.
For helpful comments on an earlier draft, I am grateful to Micah Schwartzman.
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INTRODUCTION

Employment Division v. SmithI caused a kerfuffle at the time it was
delivered and it remains controversial today. Many people feel that the
Court undermined religious freedom when it ruled that laws that were
neutral toward religion and generally applicable would no longer draw a
presumption of invalidity, however much they incidentally burdened
religious observance. 2 Others resolutely defend the Smith rule. 3 That
ongoing tension makes symposia like this one interesting and important,
even twenty years later.
Yet the controversy is actually more limited than many nonspecialists recognize. For one thing, most observers agree that religious
practitioners sometimes should be eligible for special relief from
general laws. Even members of the Smith majority conceded that
legislative and administrative accommodation would be broadly
permissible. Moreover, there is a surprising degree of agreement that
courts themselves should be able to administer such exemptions. 4 The
most intense fight today is over the narrower matter of whether judges'
decisions regarding exemptions from general laws for religious
observance should have constitutional status.
I have a view on that question,5 but my agenda here is different. I
will explore two arguments in this Essay. First, when lower courts get
down to the pragmatics and politics of individual cases in the real
world, many judges find they have all the room they need to carve out
needed exemptions for religious practitioners despite the principal rule
of Smith-including exemptions that have constitutional status. 6
Second, and perhaps more surprising, even theorists who defend the
Smith rule are willing to support exemptions in certain cases, despite
their opposition in principle. Under the non-ideal conditions of
actually-existing scenarios, in other words, both judges and scholars
depart from the Smith neutrality rule to a greater degree than is
1 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
2 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 1;
and the Smith Decision,
Free Exercise Revisionism
W. McConnell,
Michael

57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990).
3 See MARCI HAMILTON, GOD VS. THE GAVEL: RELIGION AND THE RULE OF LAW (2005);
William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 308

(1991).
4 Eugene Volokh, for instance, supports both RFRA, a statute that requires judges to
administer exemption cases, and the constitutional rule of Smith. See Eugene Volokh, A
Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1465 (1999).
5 Nelson Tebbe, Free Exercise and the Problem ofSymmetry, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (2005).

6 One expert questioned this assertion after my oral remarks at the live Symposium. I will
say more about it in Part 1.
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commonly assumed in debates over the decision. Because a chief
attraction of the Smith rule is precisely its law-like character-its
consistency, its ability to constrain judges, and its fidelity to rule-of-law
values-this observation may drain the decision of some of its appeal.
On the other hand, it may also lower the stakes of debates surrounding it
in a helpful way.
Of course, there are important differences of both degree and kind
between theorists, even in the real world. And courts that still apply the
presumption of constitutionality to laws of general applicability do so in
different ways. But the divides that separate opponents and proponents
of Smith are less yawning than many suppose, at least in operation.
Part I will show how judges, particularly those sitting on lower
courts, in fact do extend relief from general laws for religious practices.
Part II will then make the case that prominent academic defenders of the
Smith neutrality approach are willing to compromise in specific
situations. In the Conclusion, I suggest that paying attention to the
actual adjudication of religious freedom disputes could ease the tension
between traditionalists and secularists in the ongoing battle over the
place of religion in American public life.
I.

SMITH IN COURT

Several doctrines open up pathways for judges who wish to
accommodate practitioners. Most obviously, the Smith Court itself
created a few exceptions to its primary rule. Courts have been able to
use these exceptions as workarounds.
For example, the Court continued to allow heightened scrutiny in
hybridity cases, where a free exercise interest was joined by some other
constitutional concern.7 A presumption of unconstitutionality would
attach in those situations, even if a neutral law of general applicability
was at issue.8 This new doctrine accounted for Yoder, where the Court
ruled in favor of Amish parents who had free exercise and due process
interests in preventing their children from attending school after the
eighth grade, despite truancy laws. 9 In fact, some have suggested that
the hybridity exception was created solely to distinguish Yoder, which
7 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
8 Id.

9 The Smith Court put it this way:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of
a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
constitutional protections, such as ... the right of parents ... to direct the education of
their children . . ..

Id. at 881 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
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some members of the majority must have been unwilling to overrule.10
Even if its initial purpose was limited in that way, the hybridity
exception has done some additional work in lower courts.
Second, the Court said that in situations where government
officials set up systems of individualized assessment, and then extended
benefits or relief to nonreligious people, someone who was denied those
benefits for religious conduct could win heightened scrutiny.II This
exception, too, seemed designed to account for specific precedent that
otherwise would have been in tension with Smith but that the Court
appeared reluctant to overrule. In particular, the Court's unemployment
benefits decisions had examined the decisions of state officials to deny
benefits to religious actors on a case-by-case basis, and sometimes had
resulted in relief for workers who were deemed to be unqualified for
benefits because of their religious practices. 12
The Court encouraged a third alternative when it hinted that the
church autonomy decisions would stand.13 Those rulings protected
certain inner workings of religious institutions against government
interference. Property disputes between breakaway parishes and the
larger denomination were often found to be improper for court
The Smith Court cited those cases
resolution, for instance.14
5
Some lower courts subsequently have held that the
approvingly.'
church autonomy cases remain good law, even where they appear to
conflict with the neutrality rule of Smith, as I will explain more fully
below. 16
Finally, it is an implication of the general rule, although not exactly
an exception, that where a court finds that government officials have
acted with an object that is not neutral on the basis of religion, a
presumption of unconstitutionality will continue to apply, perhaps even
where the law appears on its face to be generally applicable. What the
Court means by "nonneutral" or "not generally applicable" in this
context is not entirely clear, but it has ruled against one municipality on
this basis.17
10 McConnell, supra note 2, at 1121-22.
11 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884 ("[O]ur decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the
proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse
to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason.").
12 See, e.g., Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Emp't Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707
(1981); Sherbert v. Vemer, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
13 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (citing with general approval Presbyterian Church in United
States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969),

and Jones v. Wolf 443 U.S. 595, 602-06 (1979)).
14 See Jones, 443 U.S. 595 (regarding property disputes).
15 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.

16 See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299,
1303-04 (11th Cir. 2000).
17 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
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Using these devices and others, lower courts now find they have
significant flexibility to relieve religious actors from laws or policies
that appear to be neutral and generally applicable. For example, one
district court exempted Roman Catholic public school students who
wished to wear rosaries in apparent violation of the school dress code.' 8
School officials had banned necklaces, among other jewelry, in order to
combat the spread of gang symbols.19 Because the policy lacked a
discriminatory purpose and applied equally to all students, it was neutral
as to religion-any burden on religious students was incidental.
Nevertheless, the court carved out an exception for the observant
students. It used the hybridity rule, pointing to their free speech interest
in wearing the beads in addition to their free exercise concern. 20
The hybridity exception has the potential to be widely available
because it is often possible to identify a sympathetic constitutional value
to bolster free exercise. (This is true even though in actual practice it
does not seem to have been used often.) In another case, for example,
the Third Circuit found hybridity involving free exercise and freedom of
association where the Salvation Army sued to obtain relief from a state
boarding house regulation for one of its rehabilitation centers. 21 Once
again, the law at issue was neutral as to religion and generally
applicable as between religious and nonreligious groups.
Another court used the exception for systems of individualized
assessments to order relief from a general law. It addressed a complaint
by Muslim officers after the Newark Police Department instituted a
policy banning all facial hair. 22 The officers argued that wearing beards
was a religious practice protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 23 The
Department responded that the policy had not been enacted with any
discriminatory purpose, but only in order to promote uniformity and
discipline within the Department. 24 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit
ruled for the officers. It focused on the fact that the Department had
granted an exception for officers who could not shave their beards for
medical reasons. 25 Concluding that the government had instituted
something like a system of individualized assessments, and that it had
granted relief to nonreligious claimants but not religious ones, the court
applied strict scrutiny and ruled for the Muslim officers. 26
18 See Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 664 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
19 Id
20 Id. at 671.

21 Salvation Army v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 197, 201 (3d Cir. 1990).
22 See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360
(3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.).
23 Id. at 361.
24 Id. at 366-67.
25 Id at 365-67.

26 See id. at 365. The court hinted that the Department acted with a discriminatory motive
when it "decid[ed] that secular motivations are more important than religious motivations." Id.
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Finally, courts have continued to protect church autonomy, even
where the government interference comes in the form of a general law.
One component of the church autonomy doctrine is the "ministerial
exception" or "ministerial exemption," which relieves religious
institutions from antidiscrimination laws when they take employment
actions against clergy or potential clergy. In a recent decision, for
example, the Third Circuit reaffirmed the ministerial exemption and
ruled against a chaplain who claimed that the university had taken
employment action against her on the basis of sex or gender. 27 None of
the employment discrimination laws targeted religion as such, or were
applied differently to churches. So under the main Smith rule, an
exemption from them presumptively would not have been available.
Yet the Third Circuit, like every other federal appellate court to
consider the question in the years since Smith, applied the ministerial
exemption. 28
In sum, courts in these cases have found ways to recognize strong
religious freedom claims despite Smith. That suggests that Smith as a
whole, considered in all of its intricacy, may not have had as profound
an impact as nonspecialists often seem to suppose. Critics of the
decision can take comfort in this depiction of the decision in actual
operation. And fans might be troubled.
Nothing I have said proves that Smith has had no impact at all on
results in free exercise cases. Nor does it even prove that its impact has
been small. 29 Figuring out the decision's real effect on overall
adjudication of free exercise cases would require an empirical study.
But it is important to keep in mind that such a study would have to
But that language is consistent with the individualized assessments pathway to heightened review
that the court highlighted. In fact, heightened scrutiny is thought to be appropriate in part because
of a suspicion that government officials who enjoy discretion to make case-by-case decisions and
who use that discretion to rule in favor of secular actors but not religious ones may be motivated
by discrimination that is difficult to detect. See Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883 (1990)
(reasoning that the unemployment board in Sherbert discriminated purposefully when it granted
individualized exemptions on secular grounds but refused to do so on religious grounds).
27 Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2006). In an even more recent case,
now on its way to the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit ruled that a teacher in a religious school
did not qualify for the exception because she taught primarily secular subjects. EEOC v.
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch., 597 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted,
No. 10-553, 2011 WL 1103380 (U.S. Mar. 28, 2011).
28 See Michael P. Moreland, Religious Free Exercise and Anti-Discrimination Law,
70 ALB. L. REv. 1417, 1418-19 (2007) ("[A] number of circuits-in fact all of the circuit courts
of appeal with one slight exception . .. have upheld this exception."). Moreland subsequently
discusses the fact that a vacated panel opinion in Petruska cast some doubt on the scope of the
exemption. Id. at 1418-20; see also Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality
of the Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965, 1974

(2007) ("Lower courts have invariably upheld the ministerial exemption. . . .").
29 In fact, it does not prove anything at all-I am adhering to the Symposium organizers'
instructions to offer arguments that are punchy and provocative rather than lengthy and welldefended.
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compare current free exercise outcomes to actual results in the period
before 1990, not to ideal ones. And scholars already have shown that
outcomes during that earlier era were, in fact, not particularly friendly to
free exercise claimants, despite doctrine that was nominally
advantageous. 30 I have not seen a study that compares those findings to
court outcomes in the period since Smith, but my hunch is that its results
would surprise many laypeople, if not every expert.
One interesting implication of these observations may be that the
stakes of the debates concerning Smith should be lower than they
generally are seen to be. 31 (I will draw out this implication in the
Conclusion.) If people came to realize that the neutrality rule of Smith
underdetermines outcomes to some significant degree, then conceivably
the temperature of the debate could be reduced. Critics would recognize
that some of what they hope to achieve is already being delivered by
lower courts. And defenders would realize that Smith's main rule
imposes less of a rule-of-law constraint on individual judges than the
text of the decision might lead a reader to believe. In other words,
paying attention to Smith in operation might do something to calm at
least one front in the so-called culture wars. 32 Judges are, in fact, driven
by a range of non-doctrinal forces, including popular opinion and
political dynamics. They also work to achieve justice in individual
cases, and to craft rulings that will work, as a pragmatic matter. A
porous decision like Smith allows them some room to implement these
other values.

30 See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An

Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407 (1992) (reporting on an empirical study of court
outcomes in the period immediately prior to Smith).
The free exercise claimant, both in the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals, rarely
succeeded under the compelling interest test, despite some powerful claims. A survey
of the decisions in the United States courts of appeals over the ten years preceding
Smith reveals that, despite the apparent protection afforded claimants by the language
of the compelling interest test, courts overwhelmingly sided with the government when
applying that test.
Id at 1412. My argument in this short piece could fairly be characterized as nothing more than
an update of Ryan's predictive claim that "[d]espite the obvious change Smith brought to the
language of free exercise doctrine, the impact of the decision on the outcome of free exercise
cases will likely be insignificant." Id.
31 Cf Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U. PA. J. CONST.

L. 305 (2010) (arguing that debates over constitutional interpretation have low stakes). Like
Samaha, I argue that there are "low stakes, not no stakes." Id. at 319. Unlike him, however, I am
considering a single decision, and not all of constitutional theory or adjudication.
32 See Steven D. Smith, Religious Freedom and Its Enemies, or Why the Smith Decision May
Be a Greater Loss Now than it Was Then, 32 CARDOZO L. REv. 2033 (2011).
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SMITH IN SCHOLARSHIP

Some will say it is no surprise that judges are fudging the Smith
rule-after all, they have to operate in the messy world of practical
constraints, quasi-political compromises, and historical contingencies.
But what about scholars? They have the conceptual freedom to
construct more perfect solutions to constitutional problems. So you
might expect those of them who admire Smith to admit fewer exceptions
to its main rule than judges sometimes do. And that may, in fact, be the
case.
It is difficult to say with certainty; that would require
systematically comparing court results with academic treatments of
comparable cases. Yet here I will test the argument that even
scholarship that is sympathetic to Smith departs from its main rule more
often than many people realize, if only when it addresses actual cases in
all their real-world intricacy.
One example is the equal liberty model of Eisgruber and Sager. 33
They recognize the complexity entailed in applying their approach to
actual cases, and they are right to do so. Part of what makes equal
liberty so compelling-it is properly regarded as one of the most
persuasive accounts of religious freedom generally-is its practical
wisdom, in addition to its principled vision. But there may be a tension
between the second virtue and the first: Eisgruber and Sager handle
actual cases in a way that sometimes may be difficult to square with
their abstract theory.
Equal liberty is not identical to the primary rule of Smith, but it
prioritizes evenhandedness over other values in a similar way. At the
core of their theory is a sense that although religion deserves
constitutional protection from governmental discrimination or disfavor,
it does not deserve any special benefits or privileges. 34 With respect to
free exercise exemptions from general laws, relief is available only in
situations where religious actors have been shown special disfavor or
disregard, and not where they seek liberties that secular counterparts do
not enjoy.3 5 If officials exempt a nonreligious practice from a general
law (or if they would have done so had they considered the matter), 36
33 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE

CONSTITUTION 52-53 (2007). The following discussion draws on material in a new article,
Nelson Tebbe, Nonbelievers, 97 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).
34 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 33.
35 See id. at 87-90.

36 Eisgruber and Sager are clear that a religious exemption may be available even where the
government did not, in fact, treat secular or mainstream concerns more favorably, so long as it
would have done so, under appropriate circumstances. Equal regard can have teeth "even in the
absence of ready-made comparisons" using this sort of "implicit counterfactual." Id. at 91-92.
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then their refusal to grant equivalent relief for a sacred practice can
constitute a failure of equal liberty. So Eisgruber and Sager applaud the
outcome in the Newark case described above, because there the court
correctly found that the government impermissibly showed greater
regard for medical objections to the beard policy than religious ones. 37
Equal liberty would grant relief wherever the main Smith rule
would, on my reading of Eisgruber and Sager. But it is somewhat more
capacious, folding in the Smith exception for individualized assessments
and perhaps even somewhat greater protection. In situations like the
one in Newark, it may be difficult to prove that the government acted
with the purpose or object of disfavoring religious actors, which is the
main focus of the central Smith rule under at least the most common
interpretation. It might also be a stretch to say that some of these
programs count as systems of individualized assessment. 38
Nevertheless, Eisgruber and Sager would carve out exceptions from
several of them. Treating religious faith less favorably than strong
secular concern can communicate a lack of equal regard, even where the
government has not purposefully discriminated on the basis of
religion-and potentially even where it has not instituted a system of
case-by-case review as such.
An interesting example comes from the facts of Smith itself.
Recall that Smith involved two men who were denied unemployment
benefits because they used peyote in the context of sacred practices in
violation of state drug laws. 39 Again, the Court denied their claim on
the ground that neutral laws of general applicability, like the drug laws,
would no longer be presumptively unconstitutional. 40 Eisgruber and
Sager suggest at one point that the result in Smith may have been
wrong, since Oregon's laws regulating alcohol contained exceptions for
the sacramental use of wine in several places. 41 Because the state
provided no such accommodation for sacred peyote rituals, Oregon may
well have violated the principle of equal regard or equal liberty. 42 In
any event, my point here is that equal liberty and the Smith regime share
a general view that free exercise principally provides a species of
equality, neutrality, or evenhandedness.
Without going any further, it is already possible to see that in real
cases with real facts, Eisgruber and Sager find that equal liberty gives
37 Id at 89.

38 See Tebbe, supra note 5, at 734 n.161 (questioning the Newark court's finding that the
police department had instituted a system of individualized assessment).
39 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874 (1990).
40 See id. at 880-82, 888.
41 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 33, at 92.

42 Id. Tellingly, you could also criticize the outcome in Smith based on the rule of that case
itself, since the plaintiffs were initially denied unemployment benefits under a scheme of case-bycase consideration. McConnell, supra note 2, at 1124.
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them flexibility to grant religious exemptions under factual conditions
that seem to warrant them. After all, it is often possible to show that a
government has granted some roughly comparable exemption to some
nonreligious actor. As they themselves point out, "[e]xceptions, one
might say, are pretty much the rule." 4 3 So a motivated equal libertarian
often will be able to find an existing mainline exemption-or a
counterfactual exemption that officials would have granted-and then
conclude that relief from a general law ought to be granted to a religious
minority. Perfect equality seldom obtains, and minority sects often can
be said to have been treated worse than some other group, so long as the
set of comparable laws or policies is large enough. (On the other hand,
exempting Native American peyote users from Oregon's unemployment
laws on the ground that Christian Eucharist celebrants are relieved from
many alcohol regulations arguably leaves both groups advantaged over
other people-say, those who wish to use peyote out of a deeply-held
belief that the experience would further their deep commitment to
developing artistic insight.)
Likewise, in other areas of religious freedom law, Eisgruber and
Sager are willing to extend what appears to be special relief to religious
actors from general laws. Consider the ministerial exemption, which I
have already described as an important facet of the broader church
Eisgruber and Sager acknowledge the
autonomy doctrine.
commonplace intuition that congregations should enjoy significant
leeway when choosing their spiritual leaders, despite unemployment
They therefore support the ministerial
discrimination laws. 44
exemption, even though it seems to give religious actors certain
immunity from general employment laws. 4 5 Now, they do try to
harmonize that rule with equal liberty by pointing out that secular
expressive associations also enjoy some autonomy in hiring leadersand to support this point they rely on Dale, where the Court ruled that
the Boy Scouts could refuse to hire gay scoutmasters in the face of a
local law that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in employment. 46 They conclude that the ministerial
exemption is compatible with equal liberty because it only affords
religious groups the same sort of relief that constitutional law extends to
secular expressive associations. 47
Yet there is a difficulty with this conclusion. In fact, organizations
like the Boy Scouts have less autonomy than churches and

43 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 33, at 97.
44 Id at 57.
45 Id. at 66.

46 Id. at 63, 65 (citing Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)).
47 Id. at 66.
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synagogues-in at least two ways. 48 First, their hiring decisions must
bear some relationship to their message, whereas religious groups may
hire and fire clergy for reasons unconnected to theology. 49 Courts'
intuition here seems to be that there would be something improper about
judicial interference with the relationship between clergy and
congregation, putting aside any concern about the competence of judges
to weigh in on questions of religious dogma. No such intuition applies
to secular groups. Second, a secular interest in expressive association
can be overbalanced by sufficiently weighty government objectives,
whereas the ministerial exemption seems virtually absolute.50
Because of these differences, Eisgruber and Sager are faced with a
choice: Either they can reject some aspects of the widespread support
for the ministerial exemption in its current form, or they must assimilate
that intuition in a way that is difficult to square with equal liberty. I
believe the best reading of their book is that they choose the latter path:
They incorporate the current doctrine in its entirety, concluding with
reason that it reflects popular opinion and/or a fixed feature of
American political traditions. But again, that choice presents a problem
for equal liberty because the ministerial exemption does, in fact,
accommodate religious actors in a distinct way, recognizing and
protecting the relationship between clergy and congregation like no
other employment arrangement. If I am right, then this is another place
where even a strong equality-oriented approach allows what amount to
free exercise exemptions from general laws.
This is not to say that there are no differences between scholarly
sympathizers and antagonists of Smith, even in the real world. In fact,
there are important distinctions even among supporters. For example,
Marci Hamilton, another leading proponent of the principal Smith rule,
would make fewer compromises than Eisgruber and Sager. 5' Although
she too seems to acknowledge that the ministerial exemption forms an
exception to her general approach, she would allow less room for it than

48 See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 318-19 (2d ed.

2006).
49 Circuit courts have held that the ministerial exemption applies to employment decisions
that are not required by theology or religious doctrine. See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462
F.3d 294, 307 (3d Cir. 2006) ("The ministerial exception, as we conceive of it, operates to bar any
claim, the resolution of which would limit a religious institution's right to select who will perform
particular spiritual functions."); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203
F.3d 1299, 1303-04 (1lth Cir. 2000) ("[T]he constitutional protection of religious freedom
afforded to churches in employment actions involving clergy exists even when such actions are
not based on issues of church doctrine or ecclesiastical law." (characterizing the holding of
Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir.
1999))).
So See MCCONNELL ET AL., supra note 48, at 318 (citing cases).
51 Again, this is under my reading of Eisgruber and Sager, which might be incorrect. They in
fact might have intended to take a position that is quite close to Hamilton's.
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they do (under my interpretation of their work). 52 Hamilton would still
allow congregations to select clergy for theological reasons, even where
that would conflict with generally applicable antidiscrimination laws.
But unlike virtually all of the federal circuit courts, she believes there
are good reasons to stop there and refuse to immunize religious
employers who claim no theological ground for the employment action
at issue. 53
So there are important distinctions among thinkers, just as there are
among judges. My only point here is that when scholars get down to
the details of particular scenarios or fact patterns, they are willing to
compromise more often than the debate often recognizes, even when
they otherwise strongly support something like the Smith
evenhandedness approach.
CONCLUSION

One way of understanding Smith is as an example of value
monism: The Court decided that one free exercise value, a certain type
of equality or neutrality, predominated over all others and should
control outcomes whenever possible. 54 Implicitly and explicitly, it
devalued other principles, such as the idea that religious actors should
enjoy the autonomy or liberty to observe sacred practices, free of
government interference. And, in fact, the opinion has been widely
understood in that way. That conception, shared by critics and
defenders of the decision alike, has fueled at least some of the
controversy around it.51

52 Hamilton asserts:
Of all the arenas where religious groups are permitted to avoid the laws that apply to
everyone else, the choice of clergy according to religious principles is the most
appropriate.... But where the religious entity is not acting according to its religious
beliefs, but rather contravening public policy for less admirable motives, for example,
engaging in sexual harassment or creating a hostile work environment, there is strong
reason to apply the law.
HAMILTON, supra note 3, at 199.
53 Id. She also sees a trend among lower courts in that direction. Id. at 198. For a similar
proposal, see Corbin, supra note 28.
54 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993) (using the term "neutrality" to describe the rule of Smith); id at 562 (Souter, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) ("Though Smith used the term 'neutrality' without a
modifier, the rule it announced plainly assumes that free-exercise neutrality is of the formal
sort.").
55 Of course, saying that the Smith Court opted for value monism is distinct from saying that
the Court opted for a clear rule rather than a standard or a balancing test. Multiple values could
support a given rule. Quite possibly, Smith is better understood as a decision that promotes a
clear rule than one that promotes a single value.
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Yet if it is right that Smith looks much more complicated in
practice than it does in theory, then one implication could be that many
more values are driving outcomes in actual cases than participants in the
current debate usually assume. Judges deciding free exercise exemption
cases care not only about equality or neutrality, but also about
individual freedom, church autonomy, popular opinion, practical
workability, American history and traditions, and other factors. A
polyvalent method of adjudication may best characterize Smith's actual
implementation, in other words.
People might evaluate this way of working in divergent ways.
Some might embrace a world in which courts consider a range of values
in exemption cases, saying that lots of considerations should matter. 56
Others might say that it would be better to prioritize a single principleperhaps the type of evenhandedness that was seemingly prescribed in
the Smith decision itself, or perhaps another. Still others will say that
the polyvalent approach of the lower courts is not a method at all, but
instead mere ad hockery or an unprincipled attempt to reach a modus
vivendi.57
Without taking a position here on these larger questions, I want to
point out just one benefit of the way that Smith has been put into
operation-an upside that has been underemphasized in the
conversation so far. Steven Smith argues in this symposium that
Americans are bitterly divided between at least two conceptions of the
proper place of religion in public life. 58 Partly, the Court's decisions
concerning religious freedom have caused or deepened this division,
insofar as the justices have taken sides, at least in the eyes of the public.
Possibly, Smith represents one place where the Court exacerbated the
conflict over religious freedom in the United States. And at least part of
the intense and ongoing debate over that decision concerns whether
evenhandedness really ought to predominate over liberty or autonomy
in our understanding of free exercise. If all of that is right, then the
descriptive arguments I have tested in this short piece could do
something to lower the stakes of the debate and thereby to ease the
conflict.
Something similar could be said about other areas of religious
freedom law. Perhaps the messiness of the Court's decisions regarding
56 See, e.g., 2 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT
AND FAIRNESS 1-15 (2008); Steven H. Shiffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion
Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9 (2004); Marc 0. DeGirolami, Tragic Historicism: A Theory of
Religious Liberty (2010) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, Columbia Univ. Sch. of Law) (on file
with author).
57 Cf Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight of Religious Freedom?,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1871 (2009).
58 Smith, supra note 32. Others have made similar arguments. See, e.g., NOAH FELDMAN,
DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH STATE PROBLEM AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2005).
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free exercise and non-establishment-a complexity that is often
acknowledged and sometimes ridiculed or criticized-is in fact
something to celebrate and publicize. If more people understood and
appreciated that, actually, courts applying the religion clauses take a
wide range of considerations into account and issue decisions that strike
compromises, rather than rigidly adhering to one principled view or
another of the proper place of religion in American law and public life,
then more citizens might find less to criticize in contemporary churchstate arrangements. And even if courts are simply muddling through,
and not engaging in thoughtful polyvalent analysis, they still may be
crafting solutions that really do-or really could-satisfy a wider
section of the citizenry, if only more attention were paid to the way that
lower courts (and state courts) decide the great majority of actual cases,
and less to the articulated rationales of Justices sitting in Washington.
Now, promoting national unity or public peace is only one
consideration, and it may well be outweighed (or complimented) by
others in the final analysis. Yet it offers a neglected reason to celebrate
the way that Smith and other controversial religious freedom cases
operate under the contingent circumstances of actual disputes.

